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Abstract
Background: We studied the worst-case radiated radiofrequency (RF) susceptibility
of automated external defibrillators (AEDs) based on the electromagnetic
compatibility (EMC) requirements of a current standard for cardiac defibrillators, IEC
60601-2-4. Square wave modulation was used to mimic cardiac physiological
frequencies of 1 - 3 Hz. Deviations from the IEC standard were a lower frequency
limit of 30 MHz to explore frequencies where the patient-connected leads could
resonate. Also testing up to 20 V/m was performed. We tested AEDs with ventricular
fibrillation (V-Fib) and normal sinus rhythm signals on the patient leads to enable
testing for false negatives (inappropriate “no shock advised” by the AED).
Methods: We performed radiated exposures in a 10 meter anechoic chamber using
two broadband antennas to generate E fields in the 30 - 2500 MHz frequency range
at 1% frequency steps. An AED patient simulator was housed in a shielded box and
delivered normal and fibrillation waveforms to the AED’s patient leads. We
developed a technique to screen ECG waveforms stored in each AED for
electromagnetic interference at all frequencies without waiting for the long cycle
times between analyses (normally 20 to over 200 s).
Results: Five of the seven AEDs tested were susceptible to RF interference, primarily
at frequencies below 80 MHz. Some induced errors could cause AEDs to malfunction
and effectively inhibit operator prompts to deliver a shock to a patient experiencing
lethal fibrillation. Failures occurred in some AEDs exposed to E fields between 3 V/m
and 20 V/m, in the 38 - 50 MHz range. These occurred when the patient simulator
was delivering a V-Fib waveform to the AED. Also, we found it is not possible to test
modern battery-only-operated AEDs for EMI using a patient simulator if the IEC
60601-2-4 defibrillator standard’s simulated patient load is used.
Conclusions: AEDs experienced potentially life-threatening false-negative failures
from radiated RF, primarily below the lower frequency limit of present AED
standards. Field strengths causing failures were at levels as low as 3 V/m at
frequencies below 80 MHz where resonance of the patient leads and the AED input
circuitry occurred. This plus problems with the standard’s’ prescribed patient load
make changes to the standard necessary.
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An AED is a portable, battery-powered electronic device that automatically diagnoses
potentially life threatening irregular cardiac activity (arrhythmias) in a patient, such as
ventricular fibrillation (V-Fib) and ventricular tachycardia (VT). Analysis of arrhyth-
mias is done by monitoring the millivolt-level electrocardiographic (ECG) voltage on
the patient’s chest with two external electrodes (pads). The AED is able to identify and
treat some arrhythmias by signaling the operator of the AED to initiate a high-voltage
shock (therapy) to the patient by pressing one or more buttons. Ventricular fibrillation
is a condition in which there is uncoordinated electrical propagation in the cardiac
muscle of the ventricles. This chaotic electrical activity leads to inefficient contraction
of the heart and a loss of blood flow to the brain and the rest of the body. Due to the
lack of blood flow in the brain, irreversible brain damage and death can occur in just 5
minutes. Sudden cardiac arrest from V-Fib causes several hundred thousand deaths
per year in the United States alone [1].
An AED’s circuitry consists of three major subsystems: 1) Sensing, 2) Analysis and
control, and 3) Shocking. The sensing subsystem contains the following to detect ECG
data from the patient: two conductive wire leads attached to two separate electrodes
(pads), analog electronics (usually consisting of a low-noise low-frequency amplifier
and bandpass filter of less than 20 Hz), a high-voltage protection device, and an ana-
log-to-digital (A-to-D) converter. The analysis and control subsystem contains signal
processing hardware and software to analyze heart rhythm, a microprocessor to man-
age all operations of the device, memory for storage of data (ECG measurements, diag-
nosis and therapy delivery all vs. absolute time. Also included are a voice command
generator, audio amplifier and speaker, and digital communications interface to down-
load recorded data to a computer for display and printout of data. The shocking sub-
system contains high-voltage charging circuitry, energy storage capacitors, and battery
management and power conversion circuitry.
T h ef o l l o w i n gi st h en o r m a ls e q u e n c eo fe v e nts that is performed automatically by
typical AEDs once the electrodes are placed on the patient’sc h e s t .( 1 )At e s ti sp e r -
formed to determine if the electrodes were placed properly. If the impedance is not
below around 200-300 Ω, the device prompts the operator to check the electrodes
(pads). After a satisfactory pad check, the analysis begins. (2) ECG heart rhythm is ana-
lyzed for approximately 4 to 10 s; (3) The device decides if a shockable rhythm, i.e., VT
or VF is present; (4) If a shock is advised, the high-voltage capacitor is charged; (5) A
voice prompt is issued to the operator to push the shock button; (6) The operator
must manually push a button on the AED to deliver a shock; (7) If the button is not
pushed within a certain time frame, then the high-voltage capacitor is discharged auto-
matically without shocking the patient; (8) If a non-shockable rhythm is detected, the
AED issues voice prompt to perform CPR. This complete cycle can take from 20 s to
over 2 minutes depending on the make and model of the AED.
EMI issues motivating this study
We performed experimental electromagnetic interference (EMI) studies to test several
commercially available AEDs for disruption of performance by radiated radiofrequency
(RF) fields. This was done after learning of voluntary recalls by an AED manufacturer
for EMI, after we could not obtain details about the interference. We considered the
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onto the unshielded patient-connected leads of AEDs. EMI pickup from leads and
external wiring is recognized by other standards and experts in EMI/EMC [2-4]. These
leads could couple radiated fields into the input circuits of an AED and cause EMI,
potentially resulting in a malfunction.
Our initial goal was to perform standardized tests on commercially available AEDs
for radiated RF interference. We wished to perform testing in accordance with AED-
specific test methods and general medical device EMC standards. Once we began this
testing it became clear that we needed to explore other parameters that affected the
RF immunity of these devices. Also, it became clear that there were either omissions
or problems with existing AEDs and medical device EMC standards that made worst-
case testing of AEDs (with their long patient-connection leads) highly problematic at
frequencies where we observed the greatest EM interference. The frequencies where
worst-case conditions occurred were below 80 MHz.
Relevant AED test standards
The primary EMC standards that apply to AEDs are in IEC 60601-2-4 [5] and IEC
60601-1-2 [6]. Both IEC 60601-1-2 and 60601-2-4 utilize the IEC’s EMC radiated RF
immunity test method standard 61000-4-3 [7]. The 61000-4-3 standard is for testing of
equipment and is not specific to medical devices. We found significant problems
attempting to comply with the test requirements of the IEC 60601-2-4 standard for
testing modern AEDs [5]. None of the AEDs tested would operate (sense a simulated
patient’s cardiac electrical activity) under the simulated patient load requirements of
the 60601-2-4 test standard. The EMC section of the IEC 60601-2-4 standard calls for
radiated RF testing with no injection of simulated patient ECG signals waveforms on
the patient leads (electrodes) during RF exposures. Also this EMC section calls for test-
ing in the absence of noise (artifacts) such as those induced by cardiopulmonary resus-
citation. The IEC standard for cardiac defibrillators (60601-2-4) defers to the medical
device EMC standard IEC 60601-1-2-2007 for RF immunity testing below 80 MHz for
defibrillators that are powered only by batteries. The 60601-1-2 standard requires test-
ing for immunity to conducted disturbances, induced by RF fields. No radiated immu-
nity testing is required below 80 MHz. The conducted immunity test method is
specified IEC 61000-4-6 [8] for frequencies from 9 kHz to 80 MHz.
The simulated patient load specified in IEC 60601-2-4 presented problems. IEC
60601-2-4 specifies using 1 kΩ resistor in parallel with a 1 μF capacitor during
radiated RF immunity tests. The problem we encountered was that none of the AEDs
t e s t e dw o u l dr e c o g n i z ea1k Ω/1 μFl o a da sav a l i dc o n n e c t i o nt oap a t i e n t .T h es i g -
nal-input exemption, the battery-only exemption, and the simulated patient load pro-
blem required us to develop variations in the standardized test methods that could be
used for AED testing to enable us to evaluate the worst-case RF immunity of these
devices.
Methods
Overview
We studied seven commercially available AEDs to determine their susceptibility to
radiated RF E fields over the frequency range 30 - 2500 MHz. We performed radiated
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dard EMC antennas to generate 30 - 2500 MHz E fields. The AEDs were placed in a
uniform test area at distances of 1.5 - 2 m from the antennas. The modifications men-
tioned above consisted of testing below the specified lower frequency limit of 80 MHz
because we realized that radiated RF interference could occur in commercially available
AEDs at frequencies from 30 to 60 MHz. A half wavelength at 80 MHz is 1.875 m and
the leads were up to 132 cm each (2.64 m for the combined length of the two patient
connected leads). We explored possible enhanced sensitivity due to the resonant length
of the pair of leads or enhanced sensitivity due to electrically long leads resonating
with the input reactance of the circuitry of the AED under test.
Another test modification we made was to use square-wave pulse-amplitude modula-
tion (PAM) of the RF exposure signal at 1 and at 3 Hz. These two frequencies were
chosen to approximately conform to the 2 Hz modulation frequency called for in the
60601-1-2 standard. Testing with both modulation frequencies was performed as fol-
lows. Once the worst-case RF carrier frequency was identified, both 1 and 3 Hz modu-
lations were used sequentially to see which case was worse in terms of causing EM-
induced failures. These modulations included the fundamental repetition frequency of
normal cardiac waveforms (1-2 Hz). AEDs analyze the waveform present on their
input (patient electrode leads) in order to determine if they should deliver a shock to a
patient. NSR is a “healthy” ECG waveform. It has a fundamental frequency of 1-2 Hz
but because of the sharp spiked nature of this natural ECG waveform, it contains
many higher frequency harmonics. Ventricular tachycardia is a higher frequency wave-
form with a relatively strong amplitude but higher frequency than NSR. V-Fib wave-
forms from a patient contain significantly lower amplitudes and higher frequencies
than the fundamental frequency of an NS R .W eu s e d1 0 0 %s q u a r ew a v ea m p l i t u d e
modulation of our RF exposure field at frequencies of 1 to 4 Hz to stress the AED
under test during our EMC testing. This is the approach specified in medical device
EMC standards as discussed later in this paper.
Exposure system
We designed a computer-automated exposure system in a “10 meter” fully anechoic
chamber (TDK- Cedar Park, TX) and exposed devices using 1% frequency steps from
30 to 2500 MHz. Below 1000 MHz the field was uniform within 6 dB over a plane of
1.5 m × 1.5 m with no device under test present in the plane (Figure 1). The chamber
was completely lined with ferrite tile absorber and covered with carbon-loaded plastic
absorber (45 cm wedge construction). The bottom edge of the uniform field zone in
this plane was 102 cm above the anechoic chamber’s floor, and it was a vertical plane
with an area of 1.5 m × 1.5 m as described in IEC 61000-4-3. We deviated from the
IEC test method in order to produce a uniform field down to 30 MHz as follows: We
used a chamber with an anechoic floor, rather than the conductive ground plane speci-
fied in the IEC standard. This did not affect the validity of our tests since we produced
the same “uniform exposure field” that is specified in the IEC standard. This was veri-
fied by exposure field calibration (see below).
For the lower end of our test frequency range (30 - 100 MHz), we used a “biconilog”
antenna (ETS model 3141, Austin, TX 78758 US). This antenna combined a log peri-
odic antenna with a biconical dipole to provide broadband coverage from 30 - 1000
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that drove it were unable to operate below approximately 30 MHz. No other low fre-
quency antennas were available that could provide both the required field strengths
and the uniformity of the fields in our chamber. At frequencies below 100 MHz we
used this antenna as a biconical dipole by orienting the “eggbeater” dipole elements
closest to the AED and pointing the log periodic section away from the AED under
test. From 100 - 1000 MHz the biconilog antenna was used in its normal configura-
tion. From 1000 - 2500 MHz we used an ETS Lindgren model 3115 Double Ridge
Horn antenna in its normal configuration to expose nine regions ("windows”) to verify
u n i f o r m i t yi nt h ee x p o s u r ep l a n e .W eu s e das y n t h e s i z e ds i g n a lg e n e r a t o r( A g i l e n t
Digital RF Signal generator E4432B, Santa Clara CA 95051) controlled by a personal
computer to produce the RF signal. The RF signals were amplified by the following
devices. From 30 to 100 MHz we used an Instruments for Industry M406 Amplifier
(Ronkonkoma N.Y.). From 100 to 400 MHz we used an ENI model 5100. From 400 to
1000 MHz we used an ENI model 6100 Amplifier (Rochester N.Y.). From 1000 to
2500 MHz we used an Ophir model 5163 Amplifier (Los Angeles, CA).
We developed custom EMC control software to semi-automatically perform all cali-
bration and testing operations once the operating parameters were chosen by the
operator. A laptop personal computer controlled the system hardware via custom soft-
ware programmed in LabVIEW with a combination of GPIB and USB interfaces. The
LabVIEW graphical user interface (GUI) provided control of the following parameters:
signal power to the amplifier (and antenna), signal frequency, square-wave modulation
frequency of the RF signal, E-field measurements from probes in the anechoic cham-
ber, forward power, reflected power, and if needed, digital oscilloscope measurements.
Exposure field calibration and generation
From 30 to 1000 MHz a field calibration was performed to confirm a uniform E field
level at all frequencies and at all 16 points in the exposure area. Above 1000 MHz we
measured points in 9 locations, each 0.5 × 0.5 m in the 1.5 m × 1.5 m plane. Fre-
quency was stepped in 1% increments. The maximum variation for the E field at any
of the 16 points was 6 dB at each frequency. This was measured with isotropic E field
Ferrite /foam RF absorber 
Patient simulator inside the 
shielded box. 
AED 
Patient leads 
Foam 
support 
blocks 
Uniform field zone 
E 
Simulator relay control cable
routed outside the chamber 
exterior 
Figure 1 Exposure system configuration (front view).
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remote field strength readout from ETS-Lindgren (model HI-6100) outside the anec-
hoic chamber. The probe was placed individually at each of 16 points (9 points for
1000-2500 MHz) and readings were taken of the E field components at each of the
450 frequencies from 30 - 2500 MHz. Horizontal polarization was used for most expo-
sures to achieve the maximum effect of interference to the horizontally oriented
patient leads. The E field level in the exposure area was adjusted at each frequency to
the desired level by the software controlling the signal generator output level.
AED patient simulator
We designed an RF-compatible patient simulator (AED tester) to deliver normal and
fibrillation waveforms to the AED during RF exposure testing. We used two Delta 1500
Automated External Defibrillator Analyzers connected in a special configuration
(Netech Corporation 110 Toledo Street, Farmingdale, NY 11735 U.S.) applying various
ECG waveforms to the AED under test. This analyzer/tester can generate three standard
ECG waveforms at amplitudes identical to those from actual patients. Its low output
impedance (50 Ω) is designed to deliver the same voltage to the sensing circuitry of an
AED as the case when the AED is connected to a person being assessed for V-Fib.
The waveforms are NSR, ventricular tachycardia (VT), and VF. One Delta Analyzer
was set to continuously output an NSR waveform while the other Delta Analyzer was
set to output a V-fib waveform. We used an electromechanical relay to remotely switch
one of the two Delta Analyzer outputs to the leads of the AED under test. The two
Delta Analyzers and the relay were mounted inside a metallic shielded box (35 cm ×
30 cm × 6 cm) with a continuous-hinged door to minimize interference of the Delta
Analyzers from radiated RF fields. The relay was switched remotely by applying a DC
voltage via a shielded cable that was oriented perpendicular to the exposure E field.
The AED leads were terminated in a 50 Ω resistor that was mounted immediately out-
side the shielded box. All connections into and out of the shielded box were filtered
through 5000 pF high-voltage feedthrough capacitors. The shielded box was placed
behind a panel of ferrite anechoic absorber (61 × 61 cm) to minimize reflections from
the box. The entire setup is shown in Figure 2. The entire system was tested and
found not to alter the field uniformity over the frequency range.
Audio prompt monitoring
During the exposure, audio from voice prompts generated by the AED were monitored
acoustically with a plastic funnel placed approximately 100 cm from the AED. The
funnel neck was attached to a rubber hose that was routed out of the anechoic cham-
ber and into a small microphone. This avoided EMI in the microphone, its cables, and
the audio amplifier fed by the microphone. The AED’s voice commands such as “ana-
lyzing heart rhythm”, “waiting for shock”, “shock advised”,a n d“start CPR” were used
by test personnel to start RF exposure durin gt h ea n a l y s i sm o d eo rt oh e a rw a r n i n g s
(e.g., “check the pads”, “motion detected”).
Devices tested
Seven different models of AEDs were purchased either new or used. Their relatively
low cost ($1000 - $2000) when new would make them likely candidates for home and
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ing a cross section of device designs for testing. All were battery powered with no pro-
vision for external power connections. All devices issued audio prompts to the
operator and some had a text message or lights on the panel to display instructions to
the operator for the next step to perform, such as a flashing light to indicate the but-
t o nt op u s ht oi n i t i a t eas h o c ko rl i g h t st h a th i g h l i g h t e dag r a p h i co nt h ef a c eo ft h e
device to identify the action expected by the operator. The devices tested are listed in
Table 1 with the manufacturers’ names omitted. The CPR cycle times are listed to
show how much time it adds to the total operating cycle from analysis to CPR and
back to analysis again. The lead length is also listed to provide a reference point for
considering wavelength resonance (as discussed in the results section).
Radiated RF immunity testing
Radiated RF immunity testing was performed on each AED in the uniform field area
(horizontal polarization) with its patient leads stretched horizontally and connected to
the patient simulator inside the shielded box. Testing was done over the 30 - 2500
MHz range at 1% steps requiring over 450 test frequencies. We exposed each AED
under test to each of the test frequencies for only 1 - 3 s (dwell time) before going on
to the next frequency during the “screening test.” This special test (described in more
detail below) used unique methods to evaluate the AED’s instantaneous response to
RF voltages induced on its ECG monitoring circuitry. If we exposed each of the AEDs
to each test frequency during the AED’s analyze phase (the most critical function of an
AED) and waited for a response, a much more lengthy series of tests would be
Relay control voltage 
Shielded Box 
Feedthrough capacitors  
Relay 
Patient Simulator  
(Vout = NSR) 
 
 
Patient Simulator  
(Vout = V-Fib) 
Feedthrough capacitors
Figure 2 RF-compatible patient simulator.
Table 1 Devices tested: lead length and CPR cycle time
Device ID Lead length (cm) CPR cycle time (s)
AED1 115 20
AED2 95 > 120
AED3 101 20
AED4 132 60
AED5 128 90
AED6 115 20
AED7 118 60
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AEDs require to make a shock decision (20 - 200 s or longer). Consideration of battery
life and the volume of data to analyze for EMI led to the decision to perform the
“screening test”. This test identified an AED’s susceptibility to EMI in terms of RF fre-
quencies and amplitude modulations. The screening test for each AED involved step-
ping through the full frequency range (using square-wave-modulated RF) and dwelling
1 to 3 s per step while the device cycled through all modes. AED reactions to RF were
not monitored by wires. They were monitored by examining stored ECG data after the
AED was exposed to a sequence of all RF frequencies and it was removed from the
anechoic chamber. The AED’s internal software stored ECG waveforms detected by
the AED’s leads, the time of day, any diagnostic and test data including records of
operator-warning messages that were sentt ot h ev o i c eo u t p u ts y s t e mo ft h eA E D .
After exposure was completed and the AED was removed from the anechoic chamber,
the stored ECG was downloaded to another computer and printed out for manual
analysis.
In addition to the data recorded from the AED under test, we recorded a time stamp
in the RF exposure data. This was done via software in the RF exposure system that
controlled the RF signal that was sent to the antenna in the anechoic chamber. This
tagged each exposure frequency step with a time of day. This was used to correlate the
exposure field’s RF frequency to the time of day on the ECG record. This required that
the time in the exposure computer and the AED under test be synchronized before
starting testing. All the AEDs resolved time to at least one second; however, some
could not be set as accurately to the same absolute time as the RF exposure control
computer. One particular AED was very difficult to set to absolute time better than to
the nearest minute. In that particular AED, we started exposing at a frequency know
to generate “noise” (distortion) that was visible on theE C G( p o s s i b l ei n t e r f e r e n c e ) .
The start of “noise” was used to synchronize the data. Another AED only recorded
elapsed time from power ON of the device. For that unit, we used a feature in the soft-
ware controlling the RF exposure computer. This feature was a start test button that
allowed us to synchronize the RF exposure data to the elapsed time recording of the
AED.
After synchronization of the time stamps on the AED data, the ECG record was ana-
lyzed for any anomalies in the recorded waveform indicating interference from the
pulsed RF. For a first pass using screening-test data, we looked for qualitative changes
in the spiked shape of a clean NSR waveform fed from the patient simulator (Figure 3)
vs. the square wave shape of an EMI-induced distortion. The time stamps were com-
pared to determine what frequency of interference was showing up in the ECG. Fre-
quencies were marked on the printed ECG and relative amplitude of the ECG data
was noted. In order to identify potential EMI by reviewing the recorded ECG wave-
forms, we looked for qualitative changes in the spiked shape of a clean NSR waveform.
This clean waveform was fed from the patient simulator (Figure 3). It is distinct from
the square wave shape of an EMI-induced distortion in the ECG. The square wave
shape is due to the pulsed modulation we imposed on the RF field. As seen in Figure
3, changing the RF exposure frequency slightly created a significant increase or
decrease in the recorded ECG shape. This indicated the probable presence or absence
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identified in the screening test as probably causing EMI.
This was done to rapidly identify the frequencies that were likely to cause EMI .at
field strengths of as low as 3 V/m up to 20 V/m. The range of frequencies where the
interfering RF was measureable in the ECG was noted for retesting later. This screen-
ing test drastically reduced test time yet identified most possible EMI problems. Later,
testing in a narrow frequency range or at single frequencies was performed while the
AED under test was in the analysis mode since that is the time a decision is made con-
cerning shock therapy.
During exposure, the patient simulator was set to deliver an ECG waveform (NSR or
V-Fib) depending on the modulation frequency imposed on the RF exposure field. For
example, if NSR was being applied, a square-wave modulation frequency of 3 - 4 Hz
was used to simulate fibrillation. If V-Fib was delivered by the patient simulator, then
1 Hz square-wave modulation was used to simulate a normal 60 beats per minute
heart rhythm. We did not test AEDs with the patient simulator set to generate VTAC
waveforms. We did not have the resources to perform our detailed protocol for this
“intermediate” risk condition on seven AEDs, each tested at over 450 frequencies. We
believe that testing for the two bounding conditions (worst-case/best case) of V-Fib
and NSR were sufficient to identify EMI vulnerabilities of each AED.
EMI failure conditions studied
During the analysis and pre-shock stages of operation we looked at the stored ECG
data after exposure for the following problems. All of these conditions are serious,
either resulting in no resuscitation of the patient or in the delivery of a shock when
not warranted. Krauthamer [9] defines “false positive” and “false negative” outcomes
for AEDs as follows. False Negative is defined as no shock advised when a patient has
a “shockable rhythm” (i.e. V-Fib), and False Positive condition occurred if a Normal
Sinus Rhythm (NSR) was present at the patient electrodes, but EMI caused the AED
to advise a shock to be delivered. For our tests the following were observed. A False
Negative condition occurred when V-Fib was present but not recognized by an AED
and no shock was advised. A False Positive occurred when NSR was applied to the
patient electrodes, but interference from 3 Hz pulsed RF caused the AED to recom-
mend “shock advised”. We tested AEDs with the patient simulator set to generate V-
Fib, and in a separate test, with the simulator set to generate NSR waveforms.
Figure 3 Failures as seen in stored ECG records in a short segment of ECG recordings.R e c o r d i n g
from AED2 while analyzing an NSR input from the patient simulator. Exposure to 10 V/m with 3 Hz pulsed
modulation. Frequency is stepped from 42 MHz at start (top left) to 47 MHz at end of the recording
(bottom right). Shock was advised. NSR is not distorted for the first 3 cycles.
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identified EMI as patient movement or poor electrode contact with the patient. Then
the AED would not analyze the patient’s condition while interference was present, pre-
venting a shock to be advised if V-Fib were to be present.
Results
The screening test provided valuable information. As seen in Figure 3, changing the RF
exposure frequency slightly resulted in a significant increase or decrease in the
recorded ECG shape. This indicated the probable presence or absence of EMI. Later
we used longer durations to expose at certain frequencies identified as probably caus-
ing EMI. Little interference was seen for most AEDs above 80 MHz because of the RF
voltages on the input of the AED under test were not sufficiently large enough to
induce interference. RF voltages induced on a pair of wires (the patient leads) by a uni-
form electric field are independent of frequency except as follows. At certain frequen-
cies we observed interference in certain AEDs. This interference was observed in the
form of distortion (noise) in the stored ECG waveforms at certain exposure frequen-
cies. This was due to increased RF voltage pickup in the AED input circuitry. This
increased pickup is believed to be due to resonances of the leads in combination with
the AED input impedance. The stored ECG data recorded during exposure to “non
resonant” frequencies provided a baseline to compare with frequencies where distor-
tion occurred due to higher RF voltages induced into the AED.
We exposed devices at their most sensitive frequencies as determined in the screen-
ing tests to see how the RF affected the decision mode of an AED. It was expected
that problems would occur primarily during the analysis mode. The effects we evalu-
ated are listed above in the section on EMI failure conditions studied. This was
intended to see if an AED would accurately analyze the heart rhythm and correctly
advise either to shock or not to shock based on the waveform it was processing. The
AEDs had the following problematic responses to radiated RF exposure during screen-
ing tests and/or full tests with both V-Fib and NSR waveforms from the patient simu-
lator applied to the AED. False positive - when NSR was applied by the patient
simulator and during RF exposure, the AED advised to shock patient. False negative -
when V-Fib was applied by the patient simulator and during RF exposure, the AED
did not advise to shock the patient. Other failures resulted in halting of an analysis, in
turn resulting in false negative or false positive responses, depending on the input
waveform. Voice-prompt responses included: “Pads not connected”, “check pads”,
“connect electrodes to patient”, “Motion detected”, “stop moving the patient”,a n d
“interference detected”. Each of these indicated that the AED was seeing interference
of some sort and could not determine if the electrodes were attached to a patient. This
caused the AED to halt or delay analysis until cessation of EM exposure. This would
have resulted in a delay or lack of therapy to the patent, which could have potentially
fatal effects.
The failures discovered when we performed screening tests (post-exposure evaluation
of stored ECG and other records) as well as failures during real-time audio monitoring
are presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, &8 Figure 3 and 4. Note that AED2’s failure at
the low value of 3 V/m highlights the error of the allowances specified in IEC 60601-
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Page 10 of 162-4. Also, 60601-1-2 specifies a radiated RF immunity of 10 V/m for life-supporting
devices.
Discussion
We identified several technical limitations or issues in the requirements or test meth-
ods of present standards for EMC testing of AEDs. These problems involve allowances
from conducted RF immunity testing at frequencies below 80 MHz as well as errors or
omissions involving a patient simulator. These problems result in inadequate RF
immunity testing of AEDs. The existing AED test standard [5] has no requirement for
use of a patient simulator to deliver an ECG voltage to the AED under test while
Table 2 AED1 tests results
Device
designation
Type of
interference
observed
Field
strength
for
worst-
case
failure
(V/m)
Modulation
(Hz)
Frequency
range of
failure
(MHz)
Device’s
behavior
(Observations
from user
standpoint)
Notes
AED1 False
negative
13 1 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
39-44 Verbal
response to
fibrillation: “No
shock advised”
V-Fib applied - no
shock advised.
Interference caused
distorted ECG; analyzed
as NSR. Analysis delayed
during RF exposure.
AED1 False positive 20 4 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
50 (single
frequency
test)
After analysis
AED audio
prompt:
“Shock advised”
and “shock
advised”
appeared in
the ECG
printout
NSR applied but shock
advised.
Interference masked the
normal heart rhythm at
a higher frequency
Table 3 AED 2 test results
Device
designation
Type of
interference
observed
Field
strength for
worst-case
failure (V/m)
Modulation
(Hz)
Frequency
range of
failure
(MHz)
Device’s
behavior
(Observations
from user
standpoint)
Notes
AED2 False
negative
3 1 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
43-46 Verbal response
after analyze
mode:
“Interference
detected” then
“No shock
advised”
V-Fib applied -
No shock advised
Interference 8×
higher amplitude
than normal ECG
AED2 False
negative
20 1 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
300-322;
366-370,
and 900-
915
Buzz was heard
in the audio from
the device.
V-Fib applied -
voice prompts
interfered by
buzzing sound
AED2 False positive 4 3 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
31-34 42-47 Verbal warning
after analyzing
heart rhythm:
“Shock advised”
at 47-49 MHz
NSR applied
-"shock advised”
RF caused spikes
in ECG.
Interpreted as
fibrillation.
Shock canceled
at 34 MHz
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Page 11 of 16undergoing EMC testing. This does not allow testing for proper operation of the AED
(detection of NSR or V-fib and preparation to deliver a shock).
One problem is that the simulated patient load specified in IEC 60601-2-4 for use
during radiated RF immunity tests is a 1 kΩ resistor in parallel with a 1 μFc a p a c i t o r .
The problem we encountered was that none of the AEDs tested would recognize a 1
kΩ/1 μF load as a valid connection to a patient. Consequently, the AEDs would con-
tinue prompting the operator to attach the electrodes and would not operate properly.
For this reason we used our AED patient simulator’si n t e r n a l5 0Ω load to allow the
device to function normally. Therefore, we recommend changing the test requirement
for radiated EMC immunity testing to require a 50 Ω load across the patient-con-
nected electrodes plus the use of a patient simulator that delivers simulated cardiac
electrical signals to the AED.
Another issue is the use of radiated vs. conducted immunity testing. Each of the
patient leads of the AEDs we tested had lengths ranging from 90 to 132 cm. We found
that this caused resonant conditions that made the AEDs most susceptible at frequen-
cies below 80 MHz. Therefore we explored radiated immunity to frequencies as low as
30 MHz based on limits of our equipment. We exposed the device and its leads in a
radiated field, aligned with the horizontally polarized electric field. Worst-case interfer-
ence occurred below 80 MHz. The IEC standards 60601-1-2 and 60601-2-4 do not
require radiated RF immunity testing below 80 MHz. Instead, direct injection testing is
specified for these lower frequencies, coupling RF voltage and current onto cables or
wires of the device under test. This is done using coupling networks or “coupling
Table 4 AED3 test results
Device
designation
Type of
interference
observed
Field
strength
for worst-
case
failure
(V/m)
Modulation Frequency
range of
failure
(MHz)
Device’s behavior
(Observations
from user
standpoint)
Notes
AED3 False
negative
20 1 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
40-44 Verbal warnings:
“Check pads”
always resulted in
delayed analysis.
VF applied -
check pads
warning
Distortion in
recorded ECG
AED3 False
negative
20 1 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
30-80 Verbal warning
from device:
“Press pads firmly
to patient’s bare
skin”
Distortion in
recorded ECG
Table 5 AED4 test results
Device
designation
Type of
interference
observed
Field
strength for
worst-case
failure (V/m)
Modulation
(Hz)
Frequency
range of
failure
(MHz)
Device’s behavior
(Observations from
user standpoint)
Notes
AED4 None 20 1 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
No failures No verbal warnings
heard during testing
at any frequency.
Device
recommended shock
as expected.
V-Fib applied
-N o
interference
or waveform
distortion in
ECG.
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Page 12 of 16clamps” [8] that inject signals into the leads by inductive, capacitive, or resistive means.
The IEC 60601-2-4 standard calls for this type of test but only onto the input power
cord. But, since AEDs are all battery powered and do not have external power input,
they are excluded from conducted RF immunity testing below 80 MHz. We think that
it is imperative that AEDs be tested for conducted RF immunity near the resonant fre-
quencies of the patient-connected leads. We also think that correlation between
radiated and conducted RF immunity testing should be established for these devices
below 80 MHz.
We also developed a screening method to accelerate initial testing of AEDs by not
requiring exposure of the AED under test for the entire duration of the lengthy analy-
sis cycle of the AED. This analysis cycle is typically 20 - 200 s. We exposed each AED
to 450 frequencies, but only for less than 3 s at each frequency, thereby reducing the
test cycle for a single AED to a few hours instead of many hours or even days. This
was done by reviewing stored ECG data for the presence of interference, after the test
exposure was competed. The interfering frequencies were identified by correlating the
time of day stamp on the ECG with the time of day data for RF frequencies in the con-
trol computer.
Regarding amplitude modulation of the RF signal that exposed the AEDs under test,
the IEC 60601-1-2 standard (medical device EMC) requires 2 Hz sinusoidal modula-
tion or the most relevant modulation for a device with specific vulnerable frequencies.
The 60601-2-4 AED standard requires 5 Hz modulation in its EMC section. We used
100% amplitude modulation in the form of pulses rather than sinusoidal signals. These
have more harmonic content, which is more likely to cause interference than sinusoi-
dal AM. Pulse modulation also subjects AEDs to a more severe test, simulating newer
digital modulation schemes, as is done in other cardiac device EMI tests [10] and
Table 6 AED5 test results
Device
designation
Type of
interference
observed
Field
strength for
worst-case
failure (V/m)
Modulation
(Hz)
Frequency
range of
failure
(MHz)
Device’s
behavior
(Observations
from user
standpoint)
Notes
AED5 False
negative
20 V/m 1 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
38-41
and
47-49
Verbal warning
heard during RF
exposure while in
analyze mode:
“Stop all motion”,
“No one should
touch the patient”
“shock not
advised”
V-Fib applied -
no shock
advised.
No waveform
distortion noted
in the recorded
waveforms.
Table 7 AED6 test results
Device
designation
Type of
interference
observed
Field
strength
for worst-
case failure
(V/m)
Modulation
(Hz)
Frequency
range of
failure
(MHz)
Device’s
behavior
(Observations
from user
standpoint)
Notes
AED6 No failures 20 1 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
None No verbal
warnings heard
during testing
at any
frequency.
This device only
provides short ECG
records. Insufficient
data to fully evaluate
ECG.
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Page 13 of 16other non-medical EMI standards [2]. We used 1 - 4 Hz modulation in the preliminary
tests. When we saw interference effects with 1 Hz and 3 Hz signals, we decided to use
these in our final tests. Our use of 1 Hz is a good test of an AED’s correct response to
NSR (1 Hz). The 5 Hz AM modulation requirement of the 60601-2-4 standard was
not used. The 3 Hz square wave modulation contains substantial 6 Hz and higher fre-
quency harmonics that we found induced more failures related to V-Fib than modula-
tion at higher frequencies.
Conclusions
During testing of seven AEDs from each of the major manufacturers of AEDs sold in
the U.S. we identified limitations with the applicable international standards and
potential problems with the devices. After we corrected the problem for EMI testing
by using a 50 Ω patient simulating load impedance (instead of the 1 kΩ/1 μF impe-
d a n c e )w ef o u n dt h a ta l lA E D sw e r eo p e r a t i o n a l ,b u tm o s tA E D sw e r es u s c e p t i b l et o
radiated RF interference at certain frequencies and modulations. Interference occurred
primarily in the 30 - 80 MHz range with the RF signal amplitude modulated at 1 and
3 Hz with pulses. The RF field strengths causing interference ranged from 3 to 20 V/
m. This was problematic with respect to the existing IEC medical device EMC and
defibrillator standards. This is because they exclude any and all EMC testing of bat-
tery-only operated AEDs at frequencies below 80 MHz. Therefore, we recommend that
modifications be made to the IEC 60601-2-4 cardiac defibrillator standard to correct
two problems we encountered.
Table 8 AED7 test results
Device
designation
Type of
interference
observed
Field
strength for
worst-case
failure (V/m)
Modulation
(Hz)
Frequency
range of
failure
(MHz)
Device’s behavior
(Observations from
user standpoint)
Notes
AED7 False
negative
16 1 Hz pulsed
(square
wave)
38-43 Voice prompt- “check
electrode pads”. Flat
line for ECG displayed
on LCD;
V-Fib
Applied
-No shock
advised
ECG
printout
garbled
“Pads off”
annotation
Figure 4 Stored electrogram of AED4 while analyzing a V-Fib input from the patient simulator.R F
is stepped from 42 MHz (top left) to 44 MHz (bottom right) at 15 V/m, with 1 Hz pulsed RF. No shock was
advised.
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Page 14 of 16F i r s t ,w er e c o m m e n dt h a tf o rE M Ct e s t i n gw i th radiated RF electromagnetic fields,
the patient leads of the AED under test should be connected to an active patient simu-
lator with a patient load impedance of 50 Ω rather than 1 kΩ/1 μF specified in IEC
60601-2-4 standard. A patient simulator should deliver simulated V-Fib and NSR
waveforms to the AED’s patient leads. Secondly, we recommend that in addition to
conducted immunity testing below 80 MHz, radiated RF immunity testing of AEDs
should be performed with the patient-connected leads fully extended and aligned with
the incident E-field. This radiated immunity testing should be done with a lower limit
of 30 MHz rather than 80 MHz.
Much attention is already given to increasing the upper frequency limit of radiated
RF immunity testing due to increased spectrum utilization in those ranges. The same
attention should be given to the lower frequencies (27 - 80 MHz) for RF immunity
due to the effects we observed, plus the prevalence of sources in this range. Sources in
this range include hand-held amateur (HAM) radios authorized for use at 50 MHz,
and the Industrial Scientific and Medical (ISM) bands at 27.12 MHz and 40.68 MHz
for sources in the US and elsewhere. Radio Controlled Vehicles such as model air-
planes and cars utilize handheld transmitters in the 27 MHz and 49 - 50 MHz bands.
Certain marine band radios operate below 50 MHz. In addition, new EM emitters are
constantly emerging as the RF spectrum becomes more crowded and the lower fre-
quency range might become more commonly used, especially in the minimally-regu-
lated ISM bands.
I nt h ef u t u r ew ei n t e n dt or e p l a c eo u rp a t i e nt simulator that is controlled by wires
with a saline patient simulator with non-metallic fiber-optically linked control cables.
The simulator should generate either an NSR or a V-Fib waveform that can be remo-
tely switched while RF exposure is performed. This will further improve the accuracy
of our measurements of the effects of the leads and the body of a patient on EMI of
an AED. Injected (conducted) RF immunity testing below 80 MHz should be explored
for correlation with radiated RF immunity testing.
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